Of Jointness and Turf Wars

One of the most significant trends as regards the organisation, the formulation of operational doctrines, and the equipment of modern armed forces is without doubt the extraordinary emphasis being placed on jointness. The Services are increasingly expected to be “colour blind” as regards their own uniforms, and to plan and act as the “brothers in arms” they ought to be. In a broader context, military operations shall be designed and carried out with the flexible and coherent use of all available resources and assets, irrespective of who owns what.

Jointness does indeed makes eminent sense and guarantees the best results for a given investment in defence. This remains true, even if on occasions politicians tend to be carried away, and force upon the military joint procurement programmes, which nearly invariably result in either “jack of all trades, master on none” solutions, or/and in the very expensive development of Service-specific variants and versions – the F-35 JSF being but the most recent such case.

But there unfortunately also are cases, whereby jointness actually provides but the convenient fig leaf for truly ferocious turf wars, with the Services at each other’s throat in a merciless fight for the control of key operational assets and thus a larger slice of the defence budget pie.

Something along these lines appears to be underway in the UK. The recent announcement by the Defence Secretary, John Hutton to the effect that the Carrier Vessel Future (CVF) programme (now also known as the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers) for the construction of two large STOVL carriers will be delayed “by a year of two” (ostensibly in order to implement some short-term savings), actually conceals a much more serious threat (see: http://www.defpro.com/news/details/4405/). There are reasons to fear that the Royal Navy, after having deliberately relinquished operational control over its own Fleet Air Arm in order to protect the carrier programme, will end up losing both.

In order to properly understand what is going on, and why, one has to look back several decades. Back in the 60s of the past century, the Royal Navy formulated an ambitious programme for the construction of a large CTOL aircraft carrier, HMS “Furious” (CVA-01) that was to start replacing the ships of WW2 vintage then in service. The Royal Air Force, however, saw it fit to launch an all-out campaign against the Navy’s programme, involving not only Whitehall circles but also Treasury and the public opinion. Aircraft carriers are utterly useless, maintained the light blue uniforms; our own fighter aircraft, using bases in the Commonwealth countries, are perfectly able to ensure protection to warships and merchant vessels alike anywhere in the world (and in order to demonstrate this point, the RAF did famously produce a map, where Australia had conveniently been moved several hundred miles westward). The money to be saved by cancelling the useless carrier should rather be reassigned to the programme for the new TRS.2 strike bomber for the RAF, which is what the nation really needs.

The RAF did win its precious little turf war, and in 1966 the British government cancelled the “Furious”. But this was the mother of all Pyrrhic victories, because soon afterwards the government threw the TRS.2, too into the dustbin.

The whole affair did teach the Services a bitter lesson or two about the risks inherent with fratricide battles. But it would appear that it did little to change the RAF’s deeply-rooted perception to the effect that, to say it with Hermann Göring’s immortal worlds, “Alles was fliegt, gehört mir” – everything that flies, it belongs to me”.

In view of the operational requirements of the Gulf War, the Royal Navy did eventually build the three small STOVL carriers of the “Invincible” class. In a truly astounding example of “political correctness”, these ships could not even be called “carriers”, and the Newspeak-like definition of “through-deck cruisers” was invented for them. The “Invincibles” had a main role of ASW operations in the UK-Iceland Gap and the North Atlantic, using their shipboard helicopters; however they also carried a small number of Sea Harrier STOVL aircraft to provide a certain degree of air defence against the expected attacks by the long-range anti-shipping bombers of the redoubtable Soviet Naval Aviation.

But then the Falklands War erupted. Had the Argentine Junta waited for a few extra months, leaving enough time for Ms. Thatcher to complete her plans to sell HMS “Hermes” to India and HMS “Invincible” to Australia, and to scrap the two “Invincibles” then under construction, the islands would today be called Malvinas. It was only thanks to the few Sea Harriers onboard the two carriers that the landing operation and the subsequent reoccupation became possible at all. In stark contrast, all the RAF could contribute to the operation was a single bombing raid by a single bomber – a mission with a modest psychological impact, but no tactical or strategic significance whatsoever. As a result, the Air Force was completely cut off the prestige and the halo of glory that welcomed the return of the victorious fleet. That was arguably a very bitter pill to swallow.

In a more serious context, the Falklands War did provide an extremely clear demonstration of the significance and importance of naval shipboard aviation as a superb tool for power projection, whenever and wherever this might be necessary and totally independent from the availability of own or friendly bases conveniently located in the region.

With the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of new operational scenarios that put an emphasis on power projection missions (variously camouflaged as “peace support”, “humanitarian intervention”, “democracy export” and the like), is was thus completely logical for the RN to resurrect its half a century-old plans for a new class of large attack carriers. In view of the “Furious” experience, however, the Navy apparently decided to seek, as its very first move some form of tacit understanding and a gentlemen’s agreement with the RAF, that would prevent yet another disastrous turf war.

The “Strategic Defence Review” document, unveiled in 1998 contained amongst other things a decision to merge the Fleet Air Arm’s Sea Harrier squadrons with the RAF’s Harrier units, giving birth to the Joint Force Harrier under Air Force’s operational control. The merger was officially described as being intended to “contain costs” and “simplify logistics”, but there is little doubt that it did in fact underline an “I’ll scratch your back and you’ll scratch mine” pact. The RN graciously ceded operational control of shipboard fixed-wing aviation, and in exchange the RAF would not raise any protest against the new carrier programme – and for reason, as the carriers would effectively become floating bases for the Air Force’s aircraft.

Needless to say, this was a compromise and as such far from representing the best solution in operational terms or/and the most efficient return for a given investment in taxpayer’s money. In fact, the whole idea was strictly dependent of the JFH scheme being maintained for the next generation, whereby both the RAF and the RN would acquire the very same aircraft – i.e. the F-35B STOVL version of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). This “jointness” shall be maintained, even though the RAF, after the end of the Cold War no longer has any logical requirement for a STOVL combat aircraft, and even though the size of the planned CVFs would easily enable them to operate the vastly more capable, and cheaper to boot F-35C (the same CTOL version as intended for the US Navy carriers). “Jointness” in this case means for the British Services being effectively forced to “select” a less performing yet more expensive aircraft.

But despite these inherent limitations and wastage, the above compromise did nonetheless represent an acceptable solution for the nation as a whole, and in any case was to be preferred to yet another fratricide war. The Navy would get its long-cherished attack carriers, the Air Force would automatically have a key air power role in any future operation, and the UK would receive a very efficient power projection tool up to contemporary requirements.

They all lived happily together thereafter, then - or so it seemed. Because there are strong indications that the RAF is not happy, and wants more. To put it simply, it wants all.

The original agreement for the creation of the Joint Force Harrier called for a RN admiral to be assigned a position within the RAF’s leadership. Less than two years later, and “internal reorganisation” eliminated that position – which the Navy, fearful of any disagreement that might come to undermine the carrier pact, accepted without a whisper. The next move has seen the RAF’s decision to withdraw prematurely, and without any real necessity the air defence Harrier FRS.2s that the Fleet Air Arm had contributed to the Joint Force Harrier, and to reorganise the Force to operate but the RAF’s GR.7/9 ground attack versions. This effectively ensures that at least until the future arrival of the JSFs, a Falklands-style operation could never be repeated. This major blow, too, the Royal Navy accepted in its desperate desire to protect the carrier programme at all cost.

Combat operations over the past couple of years have shown both the undeniable advantages and superb flexibility inherent with the jointness concept, and the subtle but potentially deadly risks this concept conceals. On repeated occasions, most not to say all combat-ready aircraft in the JFH were deployed for land-based mission in Afghanistan – thus leaving the two surviving “Invincibles” with no aircraft onboard, and forcing the Navy into the highly embarrassing position of having to ask the Italian Navy, the Spanish Navy or the Marines for the temporary assignment of a few of their respective Harriers so as to allow the carriers to take part in major NATO exercises. In a sense, this is jointness in full action; given that there is no air threat against the fleet, it is certainly logical and advantageous to concentrate all available combat aircraft where they are really needed. On the other hand, however, in different conflict scenarios the choices would not be that self-evident, and the fundamental question as to who shall be empowered to implement these choices accepts no easy answer.

But all of this might soon become meaningless. If persistent rumours are to be believed, the RAF intends to leverage two factors – the global financial crisis, that is already focussing the beancounters’ attention onto the need to “implement savings”; and the presence of an Air Force officer, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup as Chief of Defence Staff,- to close in for the kill.

Observers expect ACM Sir Jock Stirrup and the Chief of Air Staff, ACM Glenn Torpy to soon table a proposal for “substantial savings” to be achieved through the disbandment of Joint Force Harrier and the anticipated withdrawal of all its aircraft within the next five years, i.e. well before the planned arrival of the first JSFs. Now such would apparently be a truly extraordinary sacrifice by the Service to the benefit of the nation’s finances, the more so in that it would leave the RAF temporarily with no ground attack capabilities (the Jaguars have all since been withdrawn, mostly in order to create an urgent requirement for the F-35 JSF). In reality, however, the move seems to conceal a number of very clever goals, to bring the six decades-long inter-service war to a final victorious conclusion.

To start with, the disbandment of the JFH would free the RAF from the Procrustes’ bed of the senseless “requirement” for the F-35B, and would enable the Air Force to reformulate its procurement programme around the much more logical solution of the F-35A (incidentally, at substantially lower unit costs – Treasury will be absolutely de-light-ed). Further, when in two years’ time a final decision would need to be taken as regards the carrier programme, the Navy will be forced to put the bill for the re-establishment of a Fleet Air Arm and the procurement of the relevant aircraft on top of the already substantial price tag for the ships themselves. It is virtually certain that costs will sky-rocket to absolutely prohibitive levels, thus leading to the whole programme being folded down. And, I would bet my skirt that suggestions will be heard for these “savings” being redirected towards financing Tranche 3 of the Eurofighter programme.

It is to be stated quite clearly that such a „victory” for the RAF would actually translate into a very grave loss for the nation. The UK would lose any autonomous capability for even modest power projection or simply military presence missions in areas, where the US is not involved and there is no friendly local state to make immediately available a modern air base with all its relevant installations. Such a capability was at hand, but it will be sacrificed on the altar of parochial Service interests.

Now if someone could please dismiss all the above as baloney, and convincingly show that I’ve written but nonsensical comments without a single grain of truth to it, then believe it or not I would be mightily relieved. Nothing could please me more than having these notes classified as a prominent example of the unfortunate results of drinking too much poor quality wine during the holiday season. Unfortunately, however, I don’t count on this. I’m notoriously fastidious as regards fine wines.
Dr. Ezio Bonsignore
Editor-in-Chief
Military Technology